

Winter Term 2017/18

14335.0102 Comparative Political Institutions

MA Lecture

6 ECTS points (PO2008/09)/6 ECTS points (PO2015)

UPDATED

Dr. Sarah Berens

Tuesdays 16.00 – 17.30
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Course Overview

This is an introductory course for the field of comparative political institutions on the MA level. We proceed along fundamental analytical questions: Why do institutions evolve at all? Why do they change and in which way? What are their effects on political actors, political processes and policy making? In order to answer questions like these the most relevant analytical concepts in the field will be introduced: institutional equilibria and equilibrium institutions; institutional design, institutional change, and endogenous institutions; path dependence; preference aggregation, co-ordination, collective action, and principal-agent relations; veto player theory and types of democracy. This conceptual overview will be followed by applications towards the distinction between autocracy and democracy, democratization, and development.

Prerequisites

A good knowledge of general political science concepts, theories and basic quantitative and qualitative methods is required. Students should have completed a course on statistics prior to this course so that a basic familiarity with quantitative methods, in particular linear regression analysis, can be expected. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood.

Reading

The required reading is indicated as such, but you will also find *recommended* readings which are not required for class. The recommended readings list only serves as orientation in case that you intend to delve deeper into the particular research topic. **All readings are available electronically** (and recommended readings) **on Ilias**.

Registration

Registration takes place via KLIPS. I strongly recommend registration as this ensures that you may get information about ad hoc changes in the schedule.

Basic Reading Recommendations (optional)

Kaiser, André. (2007) “Neuere Beiträge zur Empirischen Institutionenanalyse: Von der Gegenstands- zur Problemorientierung”, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 48: 119-135.

Lijphart, Arend. (2012) *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, New Haven/London, second edition.

Tsebelis, George. (2002) *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton, NJ.

October 10th 2017

NO CLASS

1. October 17th 2017

Introduction

Przeworski, Adam. (2004) “Institutions Matter?”, *Government and Opposition*, 39: 527-40.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. (1996) “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, *Political Studies*, 44: 936-57.

Carey, John M. (2000) “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions”, *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 735-61.

Recommended reading:

North, Douglass C. (1991) “Institutions”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5: 97-112.

Thelen, Kathleen. (1999) “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 369-404.

2. October 24th 2017

Rational Choice Institutionalism

Opp, K-D. (1999) “Contending Conceptions of the Theory of Rational Action”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 11: 171-202.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2006) “Rational Choice Institutionalism”. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23-38.

Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. (2003) “Institutionalism as a Methodology”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15: 123-44.

October 31st 2017

NO CLASS: National holiday (Reformationstag) - vorlesungsfrei

3. November 7th 2017

Structure Induced Equilibrium

Shepsle, Ken and Barry Weingast. (1981) “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice.” *Public Choice*, 37: 503-19.

Shepsle, Ken. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”, *American Journal of Political Science* 23: 27-59.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. (1989) “Bargaining in Legislatures”, *American Political Science Review* 83: 1181-1206.

4. November 14th 2017

Institutional Design and Path Dependence

Pierson, Paul. (2000) "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", *American Political Science Review* 94: 251-67.

Pierson, Paul. (2000) "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change", *Governance*, Vol. 13: 475-499.

Recommended:

Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. (2006) "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence", *Political Analysis*, Vol. 14: 250-267.

5. November 21st 2017

Institutional Change

Greif, Avner and David Laitin. (2004) "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." *American Political Science Review*, 98: 633-52.

Rixen, Thomas and Lora Anne Viola (2014) "Putting Path Dependence in Its Place: Toward a Taxonomy of Institutional Change". *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Online first.

Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. (2005) "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies". In *Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, edited by Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-39.

6. November 28th 2017

Preference Aggregation: The Effects of Electoral Systems

Cox, Gary W. (1999) "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination", *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 145-61.

Colomer, Josep M. (2005) "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)", *Political Studies* 53: 1-21.

7. December 5th 2017

Collective Action

Olson, Mancur. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1-65.

Hardin, Garrett. (1968) "The Tragedy of the Commons", *Science* 162: 1243-48.

8. December 12th 2017

Common Pool Resources

Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58-102.

Ostrom, Elinor. (1998) "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action", *American Political Science Review* 92: 1-22.

9. December 19th 2017

Principal-agent Relations

Lupia, Arthur. (2003) "Delegation and Its Perils". In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, edited by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33-54.

Strøm, Kaare. (2003) "Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation". In *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, edited by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-106.

10. January 9th 2018

Institutions, Democracy and Autocracy

Olson, Mancur. (1993) "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development", *American Political Science Review*, 87: 567-76.

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 1, 2, and 4.

11. January 16th 2018

Democratization

Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi, F. (1997) "Modernization: Theory and Facts", *World Politics* 49: 155-83.

Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. (2003) "Endogenous Democratization", *World Politics* 55: 517-49.

12. January 23rd 2018

Institutions and Development

North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England", *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-32.

Kuran, Timur. (2004) "Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: historical mechanisms of institutional stagnation", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18: 71-90.

Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. (2003) "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital", *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 333-47.

Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Rodrigo Alfaro. (2012) "Democracy and Human Development", *Journal of Politics* 74: 1-17.

Recommended reading:

Ross, Michael L. (2006) "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?", *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 860-74.

13. January 30th 2018

Veto player theory

Tsebelis, George. (2002) *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton, NJ.

EXAM:

Date: February 6th 2018 (Time: TBA)

Location: TBA