

**Winter Term 2014/15**

**Dr. Jan Sauermann**

**(1403) Collective Action**

*Time:* Mondays 10:00 – 11:30

*Room:* Gottfried-Keller-Str. 6, Hörsaal des Forschungsinstituts

*First Session:* 6 October 2014

### **Course description**

At the heart of many societal problems ranging from the international level to interpersonal relations lies a social dilemma. In such a situation, conflict arises because individual and collective interests collide. In a typical social dilemma, mutual cooperation by all involved actors leads to an efficient collective outcome. Yet, every actor has an incentive to defect and free-ride on the other actors' cooperation, and if all actors follow their narrow self-interest, the community will end up in an inefficient state. In this seminar, we will identify and discuss factors influencing the level of cooperation among actors in a large variety of different social dilemma situations.

### **Prerequisites**

Students should have a good knowledge of political science concepts, basic qualitative and quantitative methods, and an interest in current research. Since nearly all reading assignments are in English, this will be the general classroom language as well. Participants therefore must know enough English to be able to participate actively. Perfection is not required – you just need to understand and make yourself understood.

### **Relevance for study programmes**

The course is open to all master/diploma students of the WiSo-Faculty with an interest in political science.

### **Registration**

The course will be taught on a weekly basis (first session October 6). Students should register via KLIPS. Students unable to use KLIPS can register via Email ([jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de](mailto:jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de)).

### **Reading assignments**

At the beginning of October a reader with the required texts for the sessions of the seminar can be bought at Copy-Star (Zülpicher Straße 184, 50937 Köln).

### **Working requirements and assessment method**

All participants are expected to:

- attend the seminar on a regular basis
- complete assigned readings according to schedule
- actively contribute to class discussions
- give a 10 to 15 minutes presentation in the seminar

Depending on the "Prüfungsordnung"

- EITHER write a research paper of 15-20 pages (about 5.000-6.000 words) in length
- OR sit a written exam

### Submission of the research paper

Please hand in two versions of your research paper:

- **Electronic version**  
(pdf- or Word file) via email to [jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de](mailto:jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de)  
**Deadline: 9 March 2015, 10:00am**
- **Paper version**  
You can hand in the paper version personally at the secretary of the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (*IBW Gebäude, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 1st floor, Room 1.09*) or send it by mail to:  
Jan Sauermann, Universität zu Köln, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics,  
Postfach 411020, 50870 Köln

**The paper version must contain the following signed statement:**

[http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso\\_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf](http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf)

### Teilnahme- und Prüfungsbedingungen

- Regelmäßige Teilnahme an den Seminarsitzungen
- Gründliche Vorbereitung der angegebenen Grundlagenliteratur
- Aktive Beteiligung an den Diskussionen im Seminar
- Referat (10-15 Minuten)
- **UND:** Abhängig von der jeweils geltenden Prüfungsordnung:
  - Hausarbeit von 15-20 Seiten (ca. 5.000-6.000 Wörter)**ODER:**
  - Klausur (60 Minuten)

### Abgabe der Hausarbeit

**Bitte reichen Sie zwei Versionen Ihrer Hausarbeit ein:**

- **Elektronische Version**  
(pdf- oder Word-Dokument) per Email an [jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de](mailto:jan.sauermann@uni-koeln.de)  
**Deadline: 9. März 2015, 10:00 Uhr**
- **Papierversion**  
Sie können die ausgedruckte Version Ihrer Hausarbeit entweder persönlich während der Öffnungszeiten im Sekretariat des Cologne Center for Comparative Politics (IBW-Gebäude, Herbert-Lewin-Str.2, 1. Stock, Raum 1.09) abgeben oder per Post an folgende Adresse senden:  
Jan Sauermann, Universität zu Köln, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics,  
Postfach 411020, 50870 Köln

**Die Papierversion muss folgende unterschriebene Erklärung beinhalten:**

[http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso\\_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf](http://www.cccp.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cccp/Lehre/ErklaerungzuArbeiten.pdf)

## General readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Schedule

### 6 October 2014 Introduction

### 13 October 2014 The logic of collective action

#### Required readings:

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1-65.

### 20 October 2014 The tragedy of the commons

#### Required readings:

- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Science* 162 (3859): 1243-48.
- Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom. 1977. "Public Goods and Public Choices." In *Alternatives for Delivering Public Services. Toward Improved Performance*, ed. E. S. Savas. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 7-49.

### 27 October 2014 Experimental evidence on behavior in social dilemma games

#### Required readings:

- Isaac, Mark R., and James M. Walker. 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 103 (1): 179-99.
- Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James M. Walker. 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems." *Rationality and Society* 2 (3): 335-58.

#### Oral presentation:

- McDermott, Rose. 2002. "Experimental Methods in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5 (1): 31-61. (Concentrate on pp. 31-41.)

### 3 November 2014 Voluntary cooperation in repeated interactions

#### Required readings:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 3-69.

#### Oral presentation:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 73-87.

## **10 November 2014 Behavioral theories of collective action: Trust, reciprocity and 'crowding out' of cooperation**

### Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 1-22.
- Frey, Bruno S., Felix Oberholzer-Gee, and Reiner Eichenberger. 1996. "The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 104 (6): 1297-313.

## **17 November 2014 Communication and reputation**

### Required readings:

- Bolton, Gary E., Elena Katok, and Axel Ockenfels. 2004. "How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation " *Management Science* 50 (11): 1587-602.
- Brosig, Jeannette, Axel Ockenfels, and Joachim Weimann. 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation." *German Economic Review* 4 (2): 217-41.

## **24 November 2014 Sanctioning**

### Required readings:

- Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter. 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments." *American Economic Review* 90 (4): 980-94.
- Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible." *American Political Science Review* 86 (2): 404-17.

## **1 December 2014 Are groups more egoistic than individuals?**

### Required readings:

- Sauer mann, Jan, and Ulrich Glassmann. 2014. "Restraining Free-Riders: The Effects of Actor Types and Decision Rules in the Public Goods Game." *Rationality and Society* 26 (3): 290-319.
- Gillet, Joris, Arthur J.H.C. Schram, and Joep Sonnemans. 2009. "The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited: The Importance of Group Decision-Making." *Journal of Public Economics* 93 (5-6): 785-97.

## **8 December 2014 Identity**

### Required readings:

- Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. "Economics and Identity." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (3): 715-53.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (4): 709-25.

## **15 December 2014 Discussion of research designs**

Joint discussion of participants' ideas/ research questions/ research designs for final papers.

### Task for this session:

Hand in a one-page outline of your planned research design by Thursday, 11 December 2013, 10:00 AM.

## **12 January 2015 Governing the commons**

### Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems." *American Economic Review* 100 (3): 641-72.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58-102.

## **19 January 2015 Institutional change**

### Required readings:

- Ostrom, Elinor, and Xavier Basurto. 2011. "Crafting Analytical Tools to Study Institutional Change." *Journal of Institutional Economics* 7 (3): 317-43.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 103-142.

## **26 January 2015 The voters' paradox: Explaining turnout in mass elections**

### Required readings:

- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American Political Science Review* 62 (1): 25-42. (Concentrate on pp. 25-28)
- Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.
- Fowler, James H. 2006. "Altruism and Turnout." *Journal of Politics* 68 (3): 674-83.

## **2 February 2015 Explaining revolutions**

### Required readings:

- Lichbach, Mark I. 1994. "What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?: Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action." *World Politics* 46 (3): 383-418.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?: Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action." *Rationality and Society* 6 (1): 139-66.